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The	Political	Economic	context	of	Syria’s	Reconstruction:	A	prospective	in	light	of	a	legacy	of	unequal	development		Joseph	Daher1		Executive	Summary				Syria’s	accelerated	implementation	of	neoliberal	policies	in	the	decade	following	Bashar	al-Assad’s	 ascent	 to	 power	 in	 2000	 benefited	 the	 Syrian	 upper	 class	 and	 foreign	investors,	particularly	from	the	Gulf	monarchies	and	Turkey,	at	the	expense	of	the	vast	majority	of	Syrians,	who	were	hit	by	inflation	and	the	rising	cost	of	living.			The	 Syrian	 economy	 has	 since	 been	 transformed	 by	 vast	 destruction	 and	 territorial	fragmentation	linked	to	the	loss	of	state	sovereignty	in	several	areas	of	the	country.	This	fragmentation	has	led	to	the	creation	of	“multiple	war	economies”	with	various	local	and	foreign	actors	 involved	 in	 their	dynamics.	As	 the	 intensity	of	 the	war	diminishes,	new	economic	 transformation	 in	 the	 framework	of	 reconstruction	will	be	 the	 likely	avenue	through	which	the	regime	and	crony	capitalists	consolidate	their	political	and	economic	power	and	domination	over	Syrian	society	while	providing	foreign	allies	with	a	share	of	the	market	to	reward	them	for	their	assistance.		In	 this	 framework,	 the	 reconstruction	 plan	 of	 the	 Syrian	 government,	 which	 remains	underdeveloped,	will	 fortify	 and	 strengthen	 the	patrimonial	 and	despotic	 character	 of	the	 regime	and	 its	 networks,	while	 being	 employed	 as	 a	mean	 to	punish	or	discipline	former	 rebellious	populations.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 reconstruction	process	will	 force	the	Damascus’	regime	to	deal	with	a	series	of	contradictions	and	challenges	that	could	be	translated	into	opportunities	for	local	and	external	actors.			
Introduction		As	 the	Assad	regime	began	to	rack	up	military	victories	and	recapture	territories	with	the	assistance	of	its	foreign	allies,	 it	began	to	turn	to	the	issue	of	reconstruction.	While	the	 legal	 framework	 for	 reconstruction	 dates	 back	 as	 early	 as	Decree	 66	 of	 2012	 and	some	 reconstruction	 of	 services	 and	 infrastructure	 have	 already	 occurred	 in	 strategic	locations,	 discussions	 about	 reconstruction	 became	 more	 serious	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	2017	 following	 the	 reoccupation	 of	 Aleppo.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 various	 diplomatic	negotiations	on	the	international	scene	sought	to	endorse	processes	that	supported	the	survival	 of	 the	 Damascus	 regime	 and	 its	 structures.	 Most	 international	 and	 regional	states	have	now	accepted	that	the	Assad-led	regime	will	remain	in	power.			Although	 the	 war	 is	 not	 finished,	 the	 question	 of	 reconstruction	 has	 become	omnipresent	 in	 debates	 on	 Syria,	 both	 within	 Western	 diplomatic	 and	 policymaking	
																																																								
1 Joseph Daher completed a Doctorate in Development Studies at SOAS, University of London (2015), and a 
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circles	but	 also	 in	 the	narrative	of	 the	Syrian	 regime	and	 its	 foreign	allies.2	As	of	mid-2018,	 estimates	 for	 the	 cost	 of	 reconstruction	 ranged	 between	 $350	 to	 $400	 billion3,	figures	likely	to	whet	the	appetite	of	national	and	foreign	actors	alike.			This	 research	 first	 seeks	 to	 deepen	 the	 understanding	 and	 analysis	 around	reconstruction	 dynamics.	 In	 this	 approach,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 first	 review	 Syria’s	economic	 policies	 in	 the	 decade	 prior	 to	 the	 uprising,	 which	 considerably	 enriched	 a	small	 strata	 of	 businessmen	 affiliated	 with	 the	 regime	 while	 increasing	 social	inequalities	 and	 impoverishing	 large	 sectors	 of	 society.	 The	 pre-war	 socio-economic	reality	of	Syrian	society,	in	particular	its	inequalities,	is	fundamental	to	comprehending	the	current	reconstruction	dynamics.		This	article	 then	examines	how	the	war	transformed	the	political	economy	of	Syria	by	considering	 how	 war’s	 physical	 destruction	 has	 affected	 the	 country’s	 economic	structure.	 In	 this	 section,	 the	war	economy	and	 its	 characteristics	are	analysed	with	a	specific	 emphasis	 on	 crony	 capitalists,	 newly	 implemented	 regulations	 and	 laws,	 and	steps	taken	towards	rewarding	the	regime’s	allies.			Finally,	 the	 article	 considers	 possible	 scenarios	 and	 prospects	 based	 on	 the	 conflict’s	current	dynamics	 to	 consider	new	 lines	of	 research	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 topic	of	 the	war	economy	and	the	reconstruction	process.	Just	as	the	war	and	its	destruction	have	been	used	by	 the	 regime	 to	 intensify	 neoliberal	 policies	 and	 secure	 further	political	 power,	the	way	 that	 reconstruction	will	 be	 shaped	presents	 another	 opportunity	 for	 those	 in	power	to	extend	their	political	and	economic	domination	of	Syria.			
I. The	Syrian	economy	under	Bashar	al-Assad	before	2011		The	 decade	 following	 the	 arrival	 to	 power	 of	 Bashar	 al-Assad	 and	 subsequent	accelerated	liberalization	of	the	economy	was	marked	by	an	unstable	regional	political	context.	This	includes	primarily	the	US-	and	UK-led	2003	war	and	occupation	of	Iraq,	a	subsequent	influx	of	between	1	and	1.5	million	refugees	into	Syria,		and	Syria’s	military	withdrawal	 of	 Lebanon	 in	 2005.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Syria	 faced	 rapid	 demographic	growth,4	declining	oil	production,5	and	a	severe	drought	between	2007	and	2009.	
																																																								
2 For example, Russian president Vladimir Putin has called on Europe to contribute to the reconstruction of Syria 
to allow millions of refugees to return home. (see https://www.theguardian.com/global/2018/aug/18/putin-urges-
europe-to-help-rebuild-syria-so-refugees-canreturn). On the other hand, the EU has stressed repeatedly that it 
will be ready to assist in the reconstruction of Syria only when a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political 
transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 
(2015) and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way. Numerous reports have been published to 
reflect this position (see this link http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-europe-as-a-stronger-
global-actor/file-eu-strategy-forsyria). 
3  McDowall, Angus (2018), “Long reach of U.S. sanctions hits Syria reconstruction”, Reuters, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-sanctions/long-reach-of-u-s-sanctions-hits-syria-
reconstruction-idUSKCN1LI06Z.  
4 In recent years Syria has experienced one of the highest population growth rates in the world, ranked ninth by 
the United Nations on a list of the fastest growing countries between 2005 and 2010 (Sands, Phil (2011), 
“Population surge in Syria hampers country's progress”, The National, 
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/population-surge-in-syria-hampers-country-s-progress-1.448497). 
Syria’s total population was 12.1 million in 1990, 17.9 million in 2003, and approximately 21 million in 2010. 
(Raphaeli, Nimrod, (2007), “Syria’s Fragile Economy”, Middle East Review of Inter-national Affairs, vol. 11, 
No. 2). 
	
The	 structural	 impact	 of	 neoliberal	 policies:	 the	 decline	 of	 production	 and	 rise	 of	
informality	
	Many	 scholars	 argue	 that	 widespread	 economic	 marginalization	 and	 intense	 socio-economic	 grievances	 eroded	 the	 Syrian	 regime’s	 political	 base	 and	 constituted	 one	 of	most	important	causes	for	the	eruption	of	the	uprising	in	Syria.6	More	broadly,	the	2011	uprisings	are	rooted	in	the	specific	modalities	of	capitalist	production	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa.	Behind	the	appearance	of	decent	macroeconomic	performance,	MENA	countries	suffered	and	continue	to	suffer	 from	similar	underlying	economic	symptoms	that	 trace	 back	 decades.	 This	 includes	 the	 development	 and	 expansion	 of	 particular	economic	 sectors	 -	 particularly	 in	 services	 -and	 the	 concurrent	 decline	 of	 productive	sectors,	 very	 low	 employment	 rates	 associated	 with	 extremely	 high	 rates	 of	 skilled	migration	i.e.	brain	drain,	a	rentier-state	model	for	managing	resources	(including	non-natural	resources),	and	corruption	in	the	form	of	a	clannish	oligarchy	that	in	some	cases	includes	military	elites.7			Syria	 underwent	 an	 accelerated	 implementation	 of	 neoliberal	 policies8	in	 the	 decade	after	 Bashar	 al-Assad	 took	 power	 in	 2000.	 This	 process	was	 characterised	mainly	 by	extensive	privatization,	 liberalization,	and	the	reduction	of	subsidies	 in	many	products	and	 services.	 This	 process	 was	 not	 absolute	 as	 the	 Syrian	 state	 continued	 to	 play	 a	significant	direct	role	in	the	economy	by	employing	a	large	number	of	Syrians;	the	state	also	did	not	sell	major	state	assets	during	this	period	except	some	plots	of	land	around	the	Euphrates.			Liberalization	and	privatization	policies	also	represented	an	instrument	with	which	the	new	ruler	could	consolidate	his	power.	Unlike	his	father,	Bashar	allowed	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF	to	intervene	in	the	process	of	economic	liberalization.	In	2005,	the	“social	market	 economy”	was	 adopted	 as	 a	 new	 economic	 strategy	 at	 the	 Baath	 Party’s	 10th	Regional	 Conference.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 private	 sector	 rather	 than	 the	 state	 would	become	a	partner	and	leader	in	the	process	of	economic	development	and	in	providing	employment.910	The	 aim	 was	 to	 encourage	 private	 accumulation	 principally	 through																																																																																																																																																																														
5 Oil production declined from 527,000 b/d in 2003 to 379,000 b/d in 2010, making Syria a net oil importer by 
2008. In 2010, oil production however still made up 9.5 percent of Syria’s GDP by official accounts, while oil 
exports remained the most import source of foreign currency earnings.  
6 Dahi, Omar and Munif, Yasser (2012), “Revolts in Syria: Tracking the Convergence Between Authoritarianism 
and Neoliberalism”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, No. 47, Vol. 323, pp. 323-331; Abboud, Samer 
(2014), “Syria’s War Economy”, Carnegie Middle East Center, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54131.  
7 Mouhoub (-El) Mouhoud (2011), “Économie politique des révolutions arabes : analyse et perspectives”, 
Maghreb – Machrek, No. 210. 
8 I understand neoliberalism as a particular organization of capitalism to ensure the conditions for capitalist 
reproduction at a global scale and as part of a ruling class offensive, which ran through the recessions in the 
1970s and 1980s and resulted in the restructuring and generation of new and expanded forms of capitalist 
accumulation (Cimorelli, Eddie (2009), “Take neoliberalism seriously”, International Socialism, 
http://isj.org.uk/take-neoliberalism-seriously/). The basic goal of neoliberalism, as David Harvey has 
emphasised, is the development of a new “regime of capital accumulation characterised by a minimal direct 
intervention of the state in the economy, limited to setting up the legal, political and military functions required 
to guarantee the proper functioning of markets and their creation in those sectors where markets do not exist.” 
(cited in Roccu, Roberto (2012), Gramsci in Cairo: Neoliberal Authoritarianism, Passive Revolution and Failed 
Hegemony in Egypt under Mubarak, 1991-2010, (PhD), University of London, London School of Economics, 
p.72).  
9 Abboud, Samer (2015), “Locating the “Social” in the Social Market Economy”, in Hinnebusch R. (ed.) Syria: 
From authoritarian upgrading to revolution? (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 2015) p.55. 
marketization	of	the	economy	while	the	state	withdrew	from	key	areas	of	social	welfare	provision,	 aggravating	 already	 existing	 socio-economic	 problems.		 Between	 2000	 and	2010,	 more	 than	 1000	 new	 laws	 and	 decrees	 were	 implemented	 in	 this	 process	 of	liberalizing	the	economy.11			Alongside	 increasing	 liberalization	 and	 privatization	 was	 the	 increase	 in	 informal	labour.	 The	 Syrian	 government’s	 10th	 five-year	plan	of	 2005	 identified	 an	 increase	 in	the	 share	 of	 vulnerable	 employment	 since	 the	 late	 1980s,	 including	 self-employed,	contributing	 family	 work,	 and	 employment	 in	 the	 informal	 sector.	 The	 2005	 plan	estimated	 that	 informal	 labour	contributed	about	30	percent	of	 total	employment	and	about	30-40	percent	of	GDP.	In	2003	and	2004,	the	informal	sector	employed	48	percent	of	 the	 poor	 in	 rural	 areas	 and	 31	 percent	 of	 the	 poor	 in	 urban	 areas.	 Particularly	noteworthy	 is	 more	 than	 half	 of	 informal	 sector	 workers	 were	 below	 the	 age	 of	 30,	signalling	decreasing	availability	of	economic	opportunities	for	Syrian	youth	during	the	period	of	liberalization.12		In	the	decade	prior	to	the	uprising,	investment	inflows	drove	a	boom	in	trade,	housing,	banking,	 construction,	 and	 tourism.13	Only	 13	 percent	 of	 all	 foreign	 and	 domestic	investments	 throughout	 the	2000s	were	 in	manufacturing	areas.14	At	 the	outset	of	 the	war	 in	2011,	 industry	and	mining	accounted	 for	25	percent	of	GDP	but	manufacturing	production	contributed	merely	4	percent	of	GDP.15	Productive	sectors	as	a	share	of	the	economy16	diminished	 from	 48	 percent	 of	 GDP	 in	 1992	 to	 41	 percent	 in	 2010;17	as	production	declined,	the	share	of	wages	from	the	national	income	as	opposed	to	profits	and	 rents	 also	 decreased	 in	 absolute	 terms	 from	 41	 percent	 in	 2004	 to	 less	 than	 33	percent	in	2008-2009,	meaning	that	profits	and	rents	commanded	more	than	67	percent	of	 the	GDP.18	The	service	sector’s	share	 in	value-added	 increased	 from	41.9	percent	 in	2000	 to	 55.5	 percent	 in	 2008.	 This	 sector	 represented	 84	 percent	 of	 the	 growth	
																																																																																																																																																																													
10 It is important to remember that Syria’s economic system was characterized by a form of crony or mafia 
capitalism in which economic opportunities were dependent on loyalties to the regime. Alienated and 
marginalised elements of the bourgeoisie not connected to the regime did not constitute a strong element of 
support for the regime. No large business deal or venture could be effected without the participation of crony 
capitalists linked with the regime. In this framework, the distinction between public and private sectors was 
blurred. 
11 Lyme, Rune Friberg (2012), “Sanctioning Assad’s Syria, Mapping the economic, socioeconomic and political 
repercussions of the international sanctions imposed on Syria since March 2011”, 
https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/rp2012-13_sanctioning_assads_syria_web_1.pdf, 
p.14-15. 
12  ILO (2010), “Gender, Employment and the Informal Economy in Syria”, 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/publication/wcms_144219.pdf, p.3. 
13 Hinnebush, Raymond (2012), “Syria: From authoritarian upgrading to revolution”, International Affairs, 
Volume 88, Issue 1, p. 95–113. 
14 Abboud (2015), op. cit., p. 55. 
15 Trade liberalization, especially the treaty with Turkey and the export of massive Turkish products, did play a 
negative role in the dislocation of productive resources and in the termination of many local manufacturing 
plants, particularly those situated in the suburbs of main cities where many protests in 2011 initially began. See 
Matar Linda (2015), The Political Economy of Investment in Syria, Macmillan, UK, Palgrave, p.12 and p.115 
16 We understand by productive the primary (agriculture, mining and other natural resource industries) and 
secondary (manufacturing, engineering and construction) sectors of the economy. 
17 Marzouq, Nabil (2013), “Al-tanmîyya al-mafqûda fî sûrîyya”, in Bishara A. (ed.), Khalfîyyât al-thawra al-
sûrîyya, dirâsât sûrîyya, Doha, Qatar, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, p. 40. 
18 Marzouq, Nabil (2011), “The Economic Origins of Syria's Uprising”, Al-Akhbar English, https://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/372.  
registered	 during	 this	 period.19	Economic	 growth,	 therefore,	 had	 become	 even	 more	rent-based,	 dependent	 on	 oil-export	 revenues,	 geopolitical	 rents,20	and	 capital	 inflows	including	remittances,	which	accounted	for	3	percent	of	GDP	in	2008.			
Shifts	in	the	social	distribution	of	wealth	and	poverty:	profiteers	and	losers		Neoliberal	 policies	 largely	 benefitted	 the	 Syrian	 upper	 class	 and	 foreign	 investors,	particularly	from	the	Gulf	monarchies	and	Turkey,	at	the	expense	of	the	vast	majority	of	Syrians	who	were	hit	 by	 inflation	 and	 the	 rising	 cost	 of	 living.	During	 this	period,	 the	government	also	significantly	reduced	taxes	on	business	sector	profits	both	for	groups	and	 individuals.	 These	measures	 were	 implemented	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 tax	 evasion	was	already	widespread,	reaching	100	billion	Syrian	pounds	(SYP)	in	2009	-around	$2	billion	at	the	time	-according	to	some	estimates.21				Tax	 liberalization	 measures	 were	 accompanied	 by	 reductions	 in	 subsidies,	 a	 hiring	freezing	in	the	public	sector,	and	a	reduction	of	the	state’s	role	in	domestic	investment.	Social	security	spending	was	reduced	considerably	by	cutbacks	to	the	pension	system	in	the	2000s.	Subsidies	were	removed	on	key	food	products,	gas	and	other	energy	sources.	Price	liberalization	made	many	products	that	are	essential	to	everyday	life	increasingly	unaffordable	for	low-income	families.22		The	consumer	price	index	on	the	categories	of	bread,	cereal,	and	meat	and	vegetables	rose	respectively	by	51	percent,	59	percent	and	23	percent	over	the	period	2006-2010	according	to	official	figures,	which	some	consider	to	be	an	underestimation.23			Healthcare	and	education	spending	did	not	rise	in	accordance	with	population	growth.	Public	 expenditure	 on	 education	 and	 healthcare	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 GDP	 was	approximately	 4	 and	 0.4	 respectively	 before	 2010—low	 in	 comparison	 to	 OECD	countries	which	spent	on	average	13.3	and	9	respectively	in	2010.24	In	this	context,	the	government	 embarked	 on	 the	 gradual	 liberalization	 of	 the	 education	 system,	 in	particular	 establishing	private	universities	 and	 colleges.	 In	healthcare	 the	government	tried	to	transform	medical	units	into	independent	economic	units	financially	dependent	on	monetizing	 its	 services.	Decree	 8	 of	 February	 16,	 2010,	 for	 instance,	made	 several	public	hospitals	 independent	economic	bodies.25	This	process	was	accompanied	by	the	reduction	of	the	quality	and	quantity	of	public	health	services,	which	forced	Syrians	to	turn	to	the	private	sector	in	order	to	enjoy	basic	services.																																																											
19 The World Bank (2011), “Economic Challenges and Reform Options for Syria: A Growth Diagnostics Report 
(CEM, First Phase)”, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/468980-
1218567884549/5289593-1224797529767/5506237-1270144995464/DFSG03SyriaFR.pdf, p. 46 
20 For example, at the Baghdad Arab Summit in 1978, which was organised to oppose the Egyptian-Israeli Camp 
David agreement, Syria was awarded a $1.8 billion annual grant for a ten-year period to reward its "struggle" 
against Israel.  
21 Seifan, Samir (2013), “Sîyâsât tawzî’ al-dakhl wa dawrhâ fî al-înfijâr al-îjtimâ’î fî Sûrîyya”, in Bishara A. 
(ed.), Khalfîyyât al-thawra al-sûrîyya, dirâsât sûrîyya, Doha, Qatar, Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies, p. 109 
22 Abboud (2015), op. cit., p. 55. 
23 Matar (2015), op. cit., p. 116. 
24 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental economic 
organization with 36-member countries from the North and South America to Europe and Asia-Pacific. They 
include many of the world’s most advanced countries but also emerging countries like Mexico, Chile and 
Turkey. 
25 Marzouk (2013), op. cit., p. 49. 
Social	 services	 to	 ease	 rising	 inequalities	 increasingly	 shifted	 from	 state	 spending	 to	private	charities	 led	by	bourgeois	and	religiously	conservative	 layers	of	Syrian	society,	especially	 religious	 associations.	 In	 2004,	 of	 584	 charitable	 organizations,	 290	 were	registered	 Islamic	 organizations.	 Of	 the	 more	 than	 100	 charitable	 organizations	operating	 in	 Damascus,	 approximately	 80	 percent	 were	 Sunni	 Muslim	 before	 the	uprising	 in	 2011.26	These	 charities	 operated	 a	 network	 that	 served	 about	 73,000	families	with	a	budget	of	approximately	$18	million.27	In	2009,	out	of	1485	associations,	60	percent	were	charities,	 the	vast	majority	of	 them	religious.28	Government	spending	policies	 therefore	 helped	 strengthen	 the	 socio-economic	 role	 of	 religious	 associations,	both	Islamic	and	Christian,	at	the	expense	of	the	state.		In	 agriculture,	 land	 privatization	 took	 place	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	peasants	from	the	northeast,	particularly	following	the	drought	between	2007	and	2009	in	 which	 one	 million	 peasants	 received	 international	 aid	 and	 food	 supplies,	 driving	300,000	 from	 north-eastern	 regions	 of	 Syria	 to	 Damascus,	 Aleppo	 and	 other	 cities.	However,	this	social	catastrophe	should	not	be	perceived	as	the	consequence	merely	of	a	natural	 disaster.	 Even	 before	 the	 drought,	 Syria	 lost	 40	 percent	 of	 its	 agricultural	workforce	between	2002	and	2008,	dropping	from	1.4	million	to	800,000	workers.29			Agricultural	 liberalization	measures	under	Assad	 in	 late	2000	saw	 the	privatization	of	state	farms	in	the	north	after	more	than	four	decades	of	collective	ownership.	The	real	beneficiaries	of	 this	privatization	were	 investors	and	entrepreneurs	able	 to	unlawfully	rent	out	former	state	holdings.30	Land	ownership	became	increasingly	concentrated	in	a	small	number	of	hands.	Evidence	of	extreme	inequality	in	the	agricultural	sector	is	that	three	quarters	of	all	irrigated	land	was	worked	by	only	28	percent	of	Syria’s	farmers	-a	privileged	 group.	 Meanwhile,	 another	 portion	 of	 Syria’s	 farmers	 -49	 percent	 of	 all	farmers	-worked	just	10	percent	of	irrigated	land,	according	to	figures	from	2008.31			Neoliberal	policies	and	deepening	processes	of	privatisation	created	new	monopolies	in	the	 hands	 of	 relatives	 and	 associates	 of	 Bashar	 al-Assad	 and	 the	 regime.	 Key	employment	positions	in	the	administration,	the	government,	the	military	and	security	services	also	served	as	conduits	 for	patronage.	Rami	Makhlouf,	Assad’s	cousin	and	the	richest	 man	 in	 Syria,	 represented	 the	 mafia-style	 process	 of	 privatization	 led	 by	 the	regime.	 His	 vast	 economic	 empire	 included	 telecommunications,	 oil	 and	 gas,	construction,	banks,	airlines,	and	retail	among	others.32	In	contrast,	small	and	medium-sized	enterprises,	which	had	previously	made	up	more	than	99	percent	of	all	businesses																																																									
26 Pierret, Thomas and Selvik, Kjetil (2009), “Limits of “Authoritarian upgrading” in Syria: Private welfare, 
Islamic Charities, and the Rise of the Zayd Movement”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 41, 
No. 4, p. 601. 
27 Khatib Line (2011), Islamic Revivalism in Syria, The rise and fall of Ba’thist secularism, London and New 
York, Routledge Studies in Political Islam, p.119. 
28 Ruiz de Elvira, Laura (2013), “Chapter 4: Syrian Charities at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: Their 
History, Situation, Frames and Challenges” in Kawakibi S. (ed.) Syrian Voices From Pre-Revolution Syria: Civil 
Society Against all Odds, HIVOS and Knowledge Programme Civil Society in West Asia, 
https://hivos.org/sites/default/files/publications/special20bulletin202-salam20kawakibi20_6-5-13_1.pdf, p. 30. 
29 Ababsa, Myriam (2015), “The End of a World Drought and Agrarian Transformation in Northeast Syria 
(2007–2010)”, in Hinnebusch R. (ed.) Syria: From authoritarian upgrading to revolution? (Syracuse University 
Press, Syracuse, 2015) p. 200. 
30 Ababsa 2015, op. cit, p. 200. 
31 FIDA (2009), “République Arabe Syrienne, Programme d’Options Stratégiques pour le Pays”, p.2. 
32 Seifan (2013), op. cit., p. 113. 
in	 Syria,	 were	 for	 the	 most	 part	 negatively	 affected	 by	 marketization	 and	 economic	liberalization	throughout	the	2000s.33				Assad’s	political	rule	and	economic	policies	led	to	unprecedented	impoverishment	while	wealth	inequalities	continued	to	increase.	Despite	GDP	growing	at	an	average	rate	of	4.3	percent	per	year	 from	2000	to	2010	 in	real	 terms,	 this	growth	only	benefitted	a	small	strata	of	economic	elites.	GDP	more	than	doubled,	passing	from	$28.8	billion	in	2005	to	around	$60	billion	in	2010.34	In	2003-2004,	spending	on	the	poorest	20	percent	of	the	population	accounted	 for	only	7	percent	of	 total	expenditures,	while	 the	wealthiest	20	percent	 were	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 45	 percent	 of	 total	 expenditures.	 In	 2007,	 the	percentage	 of	 Syrians	 living	 below	 the	 poverty	 line	 was	 33	 percent,	 representing	approximately	 seven	million	people,	while	30	percent	of	Syrians	were	only	 just	above	this	 level.35	This	represented	a	 large	shift	 from	the	 late	1990s,	when	only	14.3	percent	were	recorded	as	living	below	the	poverty	line.36	Poverty	was	concentrated	particularly	in	rural	areas,	with	62	percent	of	Syria’s	impoverished	living	in	rural	areas	compared	to	38	in	urban	areas	as	of	2004.	At	the	same	time	just	over	half	of	all	Syria’s	unemployed	were	 located	in	rural	areas.37	The	impoverishment	of	Syria’s	rural	areas	has	continued	since	the	1980s.	However,	the	droughts	beginning	in	2006	accelerated	the	rural	exodus.		
	
II. The	Syrian	economy	in	wartime		The	Syrian	economy	suffered	as	a	result	of	vast	and	widespread	destruction	throughout	the	country.	GDP	dwindled	from	$60.2	billion	in	2010	to	$12.4	billion	in	2016,	according	to	the	Central	Bureau	of	Statistics.38		 In	addition	to	this	change	in	size,	the	structure	of	Syria’s	economy	has	also	changed	as	a	result	of	the	war.			
Measuring	the	destruction		As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 destruction,	 the	 structure	 of	 GDP	 changed	 dramatically	 with	agriculture	and	government	services	together	accounting	for	50	percent	of	total	GDP	in	2013	 and	 46	 percent	 in	 2014—each	 a	 growing	 share	 within	 an	 economy	 shrinking	overall.39	Public	 sector	employment	represented	around	55	percent	of	all	employment	in	 201440	and	 remained	 predominant	 throughout	 the	 uprising.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 2016,	agriculture	still	accounted	for	between	26	and	36	percent	of	GDP	and	acted	as	a	safety																																																									
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net	for	some	7.6	million	Syrians,	including	internally	displaced	persons.41	The	significant	share	of	 the	agricultural	and	public	sectors	 in	GDP	was	not,	however,	 the	result	of	net	growth	within	these	sectors.	Rather	this	was	a	consequence	of	the	massive	destruction	that	occurred	in	other	sectors.	The	agriculture	and	public	sectors	 indeed	contracted	in	real	terms	by	more	than	40	percent.42	In	2016,	the	World	Food	Programme	found	that	losses	 in	 Syria’s	 agricultural	 sector	 amounted	 to	 $16	 billion	 from	 the	 period	 since	2011.43		The	sector	most	severely	affected	was	the	extractive	industry,	including	both	mining	and	hydrocarbon	 production,	 which	 shrank	 94	 percent	 in	 real	 terms	 since	 2010.	Manufacturing,	 domestic	 trade,	 and	 construction	 also	 decreased	 by	 more	 than	 70	percent	 on	 average. 44 	Throughout	 the	 period	 of	 Syria’s	 neoliberal	 reforms	 the	manufacturing	 sector	 was	 falling	 apart,	 becoming	 either	 fragmented	 into	 small	workshops	 with	 low	 productivity	 and	 decreasing	 competitiveness	 or	 scattered	industrial	establishments	in	need	of	political	support	and	protection.45	In	2016,	up	to	90	percent	 of	 industrial	 enterprises	 in	 the	main	 conflict	 areas	 such	 as	Aleppo	had	 closed	down	while	the	remaining	ones	operated	at	only	30	percent	capacity.46			Moreover,	the	closure	of	many	workplaces	since	the	beginning	of	the	uprising	in	March	2011	 led	 to	massive	 job	 losses.	The	economy	 lost	2.1	million	actual	and	potential	 jobs	between	 2010	 and	 2015.	 Unemployment	 in	 2015	 reached	 55	 percent.	 Youth	unemployment	increased	from	69	percent	in	2013	to	78	percent	in	2015.47			Despite	 this	 increase	 in	 unemployment,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2017,	 businessmen	 in	 various	Syrian	industries	were	complaining	of	a	lack	of	manpower.	This	was	mainly	a	result	of	massive	emigration	of	working-age	skilled	workers	and	the	loss	of	less-skilled	workers	through	 death,	 injury,	 arrest,	 exile	 and	 other	war-related	 factors.	 The	 lack	 of	 internal	mobility	of	Syrians	due	to	insecurity	was	another	factor	exacerbating	the	availability	of	workforce.	 In	April	2017,	a	report	by	the	FAO	and	the	World	Food	Programme	cited	a	shortage	in	farm	labourers	as	a	challenge	facing	the	Syrian	agricultural	sector.48		The	regime’s	resources,	including	its	foreign	currency	reserves	and	fiscal	revenues,	were	reduced	considerably	 throughout	 the	war	years.	 In	response,	 the	government	engaged	in	 new	 austerity	 measures	 and	 reduced	 subsidies	 on	 essential	 products,	 negatively	impacting	 the	 living	 conditions	 of	 the	 country’s	 poor	 and	working	 class.	Oil	 revenues,	which	accounted	for	a	large	portion	of	state	revenues	until	2012,	evaporated	completely																																																									
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while	 tax	 revenues	 declined	 considerably.	 In	 mid-2018,	 indirect	 tax	 revenues	constituted	 70	 percent	 of	 the	 government's	 fiscal	 revenues.49	The	 national	 budget	 for	2017	was	2.6	trillion	SYP	(around	$5	billion	as	of	 late	2018)	 increasing	 in	2018	to	3.1	trillion	SYP	and	increasing	once	again	in	2019	to	SYP	3.9	trillion.50	In	the	2019	budget,	the	 reconstruction	 was	 not	 allocated	 more	 than	 50	 billion	 SYP,	 equivalent	 to	 $115	million.51			The	conflict	also	generated	increasing	regional	economic	disparities.	While	the	poverty	rate	 increased	 in	 all	 governorates,	 it	 varied	 by	 region.	 Those	 governorates	 that	witnessed	 intense	 conflict	 and	 had	 higher	 historical	 rates	 of	 poverty	 suffered	 most.	Thus,	people	in	Raqqa	were	the	poorest	with	91.6	percent	of	its	inhabitants	living	below	the	overall	poverty	line,	while	those	in	Idlib,	Deir	Zor,	and	rural	Damascus	also	suffered	from	 high	 rates	 of	 overall	 poverty.	 The	 lowest	 rate	 was	 in	 Suwayda	 at	 77.2	 percent,	followed	by	Lattakia,	Damascus	and	Tartus	respectively.52			At	the	same	time,	new	hubs	of	economic	investment	appeared	during	the	war,	as	a	result	of	military	 conflicts	 raging	 in	 traditional	 areas	 of	 investments	 such	 as	 Aleppo,	 Homs,	Hama	 and	 rural	 Damascus.	 The	 regions	 that	 were	 insulated	 from	 the	 extensive	destruction	 and	 unrelenting	 violence	 profited	 economically	 from	 this	 situation	 by	benefiting	from	the	transfer	of	companies	and	industries.	Public	and	private	investments	also	grew	significantly	in	these	areas.			The	 province	 of	 Suwayda	 for	 example	 benefited	 from	 a	 greater	 share	 of	 investments	throughout	the	years	of	the	uprising	because	of	its	relative	safety	and	proximity	to	the	Syrian	 capital.	 It	 was,	 however,	 Syria’s	 northwest	 coastal	 region	 whose	 economic	situation	 improved	 most	 as	 a	 result	 of	 its	 relative	 stability	 throughout	 the	 war.53	Together	Suwayda,	Tartus,	and	Lattakia	hosted	68	percent	of	all	the	projects	licensed	by	the	Syrian	Investment	Agency.54	In	comparison,	in	2010,	their	combined	share	had	only	amounted	to	11	percent.55		In	2017	following	years	of	steep	decline,	the	Syrian	business	environment	began	to	see	improvements	 for	 some	companies	 in	certain	sectors	 such	as	 luxury	hotels	 (e.g.	Cham	Palaces	and	Hotels),	transport	and	logistics	companies	(Syrianair,	Al-Ahliah	Transport56,	Lattakia	 International	 Container	 Terminal,57	and	 Damascus	 Cargo	 Village58).	 Al-Badia																																																									
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Cement,	 the	 only	 private	 sector	 cement	 company	 still	 operating	 in	 Syria,	 for	 example	saw	its	revenues	almost	double	from	13.8	billion	SYP	in	2016	to	26.7	billion	in	2017,	a	large	overall	increase	even	accounting	for	currency	depreciation	over	that	period.59			The	conquest	of	Eastern	Ghouta	and	Daraa	Province	by	pro-regime	forces	respectively	in	April	and	July	2018	would	also	promised	to	have	a	positive	economic	impact	for	the	regime,	although	 the	conquest	needed	 time	 to	be	converted	 into	economic	benefits.	 In	Eastern	Ghouta,	following	its	recapture,	intensive	discussions	among	government	circles	and	representatives	of	industry	were	held	in	late	2018	with	a	focus	on	accelerating	the	rehabilitation	 and	 rebuilding	 of	 hundreds	 of	 factories	 to	 boost	 the	 local	 economy	 and	employment	while	 bringing	more	 security	 to	Damascus.	 This	 region	was	 previously	 a	major	 supplier	 of	 food	products	 to	Damascus;	 in	 addition,	 it	was	 also	home	 to	 textile,	chemicals,	 and	 furniture	 factories.	 However,	 industrial	 facilities	 suffered	 significant	destruction.	 According	 to	 figures	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Industry	 and	 the	 General	Establishment	for	Chemical	Industries,	industrial	companies	suffered	direct	losses	of	81	billion	SYP	due	to	damage	to	their	 facilities	 in	Ghouta	alone,	while	rehabilitating	these	facilities	would	cost	double	that.60	The	return	of	investors	and	inhabitants	has	also	been	delayed	 or	 prevented	 by	 the	 division	 of	 power	 of	 these	 areas	 by	 various	 security	services.			In	Daraa	province,	 the	conquest	of	 the	Nasib	border	crossing	with	 Jordan	was	a	major	focal	point	 strategically	and	economically.	 Its	 conquest	on	October	15,	2018	reopened	key	trade	routes	for	Damascus.	These	include	renewed	access	to	the	Gulf	countries—an	important	market	before	2011—and	therefore	an	overall	decrease	in	price	for	imports	from	 from	 Jordan	 and	 the	 Gulf.	 Transit	 revenues	 to	 and	 from	 Lebanon	 would	 also	increase	as	a	result	because	Syria	is	the	only	land	route	for	Lebanese	exports	to	the	Gulf	and	 Iraq.61	A	 few	weeks	 prior	 to	 the	 recapture	 of	 the	Nasib	 crossing,	 the	Homs-Hama	motorway	reopened	as	well,	further	facilitating	previously	closed	commercial	routes.		
War	profiteering:	deepening	pre-war	practises		Territorial	fragmentation	resulting	from	the	state’s	loss	of	sovereignty	in	different	areas	of	 the	 country	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 “multiple	war	 economies”	with	 various	 local	 and	foreign	 actors	 involved	 in	 its	 dynamics.	 This	 fragmentation	 profoundly	 affected	 the	stratification	 and	 composition	 of	 economic	 networks,	 particularly	 those	 of	 the	 elite.62	Both	 in	 areas	 controlled	 by	 the	 armed	 opposition	 and	 in	 areas	 under	 regime	 control,																																																																																																																																																																														
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similar	 “war	 economy”	 patterns	 and	 characteristics	 could	 be	 observed,	 such	 as	 an	increase	 in	 informal	 economic	 activity,	 smuggling,	 extortionary	 violence	 and	 illegal	activities,	and	the	development	of	new	centres	of	political	power.		The	 security	 situation	 fostered	 the	 development	 of	 “war	 commanders”	 and	 the	emergence	 of	 a	 “new	 guard”	 of	 nouveaux	 riche	 businessmen	 who	 accumulated	enormous	wealth	throughout	the	years.	To	launder	their	money,	war	traders	turned	to	a	number	of	methods,	most	importantly	buying	and	trading	real	estate,	luxury	cars,	gold,	or	 currency.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 centres	 of	 power—although	 the	Damascus-based	 regime	 remained	 the	 main	 one—which	 saw	 new	 entanglements	between	 the	 new	 guard	 of	 businessmen,	 the	 army	 and	 the	 security	 sector	 more	broadly.63		By	accumulating	profits	and	power,	these	new	power	constellations	came	to	exert	a	large	degree	of	control	over	the	lives	of	Syrians	living	in	regime-controlled	areas.	At	 the	 same	 time,	warlords	were	 increasingly	 integrating	 into	 the	 formal	 economy	by	establishing	 formal	 companies	 which	 were	 registered	 as	 limited	 liabilities,	 or	 by	participating	in	investment	projects,	including	real	estate,	land	and	businesses.64		Similarly,	in	regions	suffering	sieges	in	opposition-held	areas	in	which	local	populations	suffered	 shortages	 of	 food,	 water,	 electricity,	 and	 fuel,	 all	 armed	 groups	 whether	members	of	the	Syrian	Arab	Army	(SAA),	loyalist	militias,	or	military	opposition	factions	exploited	 the	 situation	 to	 accumulate	 profit.	 Pro-regime	 armed	 forces	 erected	checkpoints	 at	 strategic	 entry	 points	 to	 besieged	 areas,	 providing	 them	 with	 ample	opportunities	 for	 illegal	 economic	 practices	 such	 as	 allowing	 goods	 in	 exchange	 for	bribes.	 Local	 traders	 with	 connections	 to	 regime	 security	 forces	 also	 benefited	 from	sieges.	Often	they	would	try	to	secure	contracts	from	the	highest	levels	of	the	regime	to	ensure	 monopoly	 over	 the	 supply	 of	 a	 certain	 good	 into	 a	 besieged	 area	 while	simultaneously	 negotiating	 fees	 with	 the	 opposition-armed	 groups	 in	 control	 to	 get	goods	 across	 checkpoints.	 Once	 goods	 were	 brought	 into	 a	 besieged	 area,	 traders	typically	hid	or	kept	them	and	sold	them	strategically	to	maximize	profits.65			Some	armed	opposition	factions	also	profiteered	from	sieges.	They	often	seized	the	best	and	 most	 crucial	 supplies	 for	 battalion	 members	 while	 civic	 organizations	 and	 local	councils	 struggled	 to	meet	civilians’	basic	needs.	For	example,	 some	armed	opposition	groups	in	the	besieged	region	of	Eastern	Ghouta	dug	tunnels	to	the	Barzeh	and	Qaboun	neighbourhoods	and	engaged	 in	profitable	 trafficking.	 Jaysh	al-Islam	and	 its	 surrogate	businessmen	gained	near-monopolistic	control	over	food	imports	throughout	the	period	they	 dominated	 these	 areas	 of	 Eastern	 Ghouta,	 especially	 after	 2016.	 Traders	 were	allowed	 to	 bring	 non-food	 items,	 like	 cigarettes,	 into	 Eastern	 Ghouta	 and	 sell	 these	privately	 at	 a	 higher	 profit.66	The	 control	 of	 the	 tunnels	 resulted	 in	 internal	 conflict	between	 different	 armed	 opposition	 groups.	 Ghouta	 was	 the	 scene	 of	 many	 street	protests	 by	 civilians	 accusing	 different	 armed	 opposition	 groups	 of	 profiteering	 and																																																									
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seizing	 food	 and	 other	 products	 for	 themselves.	 Civilians	 also	 denounced	 opposition	groups	 for	 having	 internal	 conflicts	 between	 themselves	 for	 control	 of	 these	 lucrative	tunnels	instead	of	fighting	the	regime.			In	other	areas,	it	was	the	control	of	border	crossings	with	Turkey	that	became	a	priority	for	 some	 armed	 opposition	 groups	 in	 order	 to	 accumulate	 capital.	 Control	 of	 these	crossings	 turned	 into	a	 source	of	 conflicts	between	 them.	Ahrar	al-Sham,	 for	example,	was	the	sole	controller	of	the	Bab	al-Hawa	crossing	throughout	2015	and	2016,	earning	between	$3.6	to	$4.8	million	per	month.67	Control	over	this	crossing	has	been	one	of	the	main	factors	behind	infighting	between	opposition	armed	forces	since	the	beginning	of	the	uprising,	notably	 in	 the	case	of	 the	conflicts	between	Hay’at	Tahrir	al-Sham	(HTS)	and	Ahrar	al-Sham	in	July	of	2017.			Throughout	 the	uprising,	 regime	and	armed	opposition	 forces	also	 imposed	 their	own	customs	 fees	on	goods	crossing	 from	areas	 they	controlled	 to	enemy-controlled	areas.	These	 unofficial	 commercial	 crossings	 benefited	 both	 sides	 economically.	 Among	 the	most	 important	 of	 these	 routes	 was	 the	 one	 between	 regime-controlled	 Hama	 and	opposition-held	 Idlib.	Dozens	of	 loads	 travelled	 this	 route	both	ways	daily,	 the	 largest	daily	commercial	traffic	between	the	two	armed	sides.68		Trade	in	imported	goods	became	a	major	source	of	lucrative	business	deals	because	of	shortages	 due	 to	 vastly	 reduced	 domestic	 production,	 the	 absence	 of	 regime	investments,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 specific	 goods	 like	 foods,	 pharmaceuticals	 and	 oil	derivatives.69	A	Syrian	pro-regime	online	publication,	called	Sahibat	al-Jalala,	claimed	in	mid-2016	that	a	handful	of	traders	controlled	as	much	as	60	percent	of	all	Syria’s	import	trade,	indicating	it	was	their	connections	with	top	regime	individuals	that	allowed	them	to	 control	 such	 a	 large	 share	 of	 the	 market.	 The	 same	 publication	 had	 a	 few	 weeks	earlier	published	a	report	indicating	that	two	importers	alone	controlled	20	percent	of	all	 import	 trade	 each,	 two	 others	 controlled	 10	 and	 5	 percent	 respectively,	 and	 two	others	controlled	3	percent	each.70			
III. Wartime	reconstruction	plans		
	Syria’s	 reconstruction	 is	 likely	 the	main	 avenue	 through	which	 the	 regime	 and	 crony	capitalists	 will	 consolidate	 their	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 and	 domination	 over	Syrian	 society	 as	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 war	 decreases.	 Meanwhile	 reconstruction	 may	provide	 the	 regime	 ample	 opportunities	 to	 reward	 foreign	 allies	 for	 their	 assistance.	This	helps	explain	why	the	regime	has	not	ceased	to	promote	new	legislation	to	frame	the	reconstruction	process,	with	a	particular	acceleration	over	the	past	two	years.	These	new	laws	and	war	economy	practices	have	benefited	both	crony	capitalists	historically	known	for	their	close	links	with	the	regime	as	well	as	a	new	economic	elite	affiliated	to																																																									
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the	 regime.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 regime’s	 foreign	 allies,	which	have	 been	fundamental	 in	 the	 consolidation	of	 an	 economy	of	dependency,	will	 be	 central	 in	 the	reconstruction	process.		So	 far,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 a	 project	 in	 the	 Damascus	 suburb	 of	 Basateen	 al-Razi,	reconstruction	has	not	focused	on	the	rebuilding	of	large	housing	areas	destroyed	by	the	war.	Rather,	reconstruction	so	far	has	focused	on	the	rehabilitation	of	roads	and	some	services	and	infrastructure,	such	as	electricity	and	water.	This	prioritization	serves	the	need	of	specific	economic	sectors—internal	trade,	services,	and	industries—and	serves	to	promote	capital	accumulation	within	the	country.					
The	new	legislative	arsenal	and	its	implementation			Decree	66	of	2012,	which	allowed	the	Damascus	governorate	to	expel	the	populations	of	two	 large	 areas	 in	 Damascus,71	was	 inspired	 by	 some	 aspects	 of	 a	 2007	 Damascus	Master	 Urban	 Plan	 to	 raze	 and	 renovate	 these	 same	 neighbourhoods. 72 	The	implementation	of	this	plan	was	interrupted	by	the	uprising	in	2011.	This	area	was	and	is	 still	 considered	 an	 immensely	 lucrative	 real	 estate	 opportunity.	 It	 contains	undeveloped	farmland	and	informal	housing	with	some	parts	within	walking	distance	of	the	centre	of	Damascus.73	Homs	was	also	the	target	of	reconstruction	prior	to	2011,	and	its	 corresponding	 reconstruction	 plan	 focused	 on	 three	 of	 the	 city's	 most	 destroyed	districts	-Baba	Amr,	Sultanieh	and	Jobar.	This	plan	would	rebuild	465	buildings,	able	to	house	 75,000	 people,	 at	 a	 cost	 of	 $4	 billion,	 according	 to	 Homs'	 governor,	 Talal	 al-Barazi.74	The	new	urban	plan	took	its	inspiration	from	the	past	"Homs	Dream"75	project	directed	by	the	former	governor	of	Homs,	Muhammad	Iyad	Ghazal,	who	was	dismissed	by	Bashar	al-Assad	at	the	beginning	of	the	demonstrations	in	2011	because	he	was	the	main	target	of	protesters	at	that	time	in	the	city.			In	April	2018,	 the	Syrian	government	 issued	a	new	 law,	Decree	No.	10,76	which	was	a	national	expansion	of	Decree	66.	 In	September,	 the	Damascus	Governorate	Committee	issued	 a	 report	 announcing	 the	 destruction	 and	 rebuilding	 under	 Law	 No.	 10	 of	Tadamon	 district	 in	 Damascus.	 Other	 areas	 of	 Damascus	 such	 as	 Jobar,	 Barzeh,	 and																																																									
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Qaboun	were	also	scheduled	to	be	studied	at	the	beginning	of	2019	for	reconstruction	under	Law	no.	10.77			This	 legislation	 was	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 process	 of	 a	 deepening	 neoliberal	 project	 in	 the	country.	 In	 January	 2016,	 the	 Public	 Private	 Partnership	 (PPP)	 Law	 was	 passed,	 six	years	 after	 it	 had	been	drafted,	 authorizing	 the	private	 sector	 to	manage	 and	develop	state	 assets	 in	 all	 sectors	 of	 the	 economy	 except	 for	 oil.	 Economy	 and	 Foreign	 Trade	Minister	Humam	al-Jazaeri	declared	that	the	law	was	“a	legal	framework	for	regulating	relations	between	the	public	and	private	sectors	and	meets	the	growing	economic	and	social	 needs	 in	 Syria,	 particularly	 in	 the	 field	 of	 reconstruction,”	while	 also	 providing	“the	 private	 sector	with	 the	 opportunity	 to	 contribute	 to	 economic	 development	 as	 a	main	and	active	partner”.78			The	new	PPP	 law	 is	 likely	 to	 facilitate	 the	 further	capturing	of	public	assets	by	crony-capitalists	on	conditions	widely	favourable	to	them.	Already	prior	to	the	war,	PPPs	were	considered	a	key	instrument	to	accelerate	the	mobilization	of	private	capital,	especially	in	the	power	sector.79	This	PPP	law	also	has	to	be	understood	in	the	context	of	a	more	general	deepening	of	regional	neoliberal	dynamics,	especially	in	the	Gulf	monarchies	in	economic	 sectors	 previously	 managed	 solely	 by	 the	 public	 sector.	 The	 use	 of	 PPPs	therefore	opens	new	opportunities	of	 capital	 accumulation	 for	private	 actors.80	In	 this	framework,	 Prime	 Minister	 Khamis	 announced	 in	 September	 2018	 during	 a	 meeting	with	 representatives	 of	 companies	 and	 businessmen	 participating	 in	 the	 Damascus	International	Fair	 that	 the	government	would	 likely	open	50	 infrastructure	projects	 in	the	country	to	private	investors	under	public	private	partnership.81		Reconstruction	projects	similarly	follow	a	neoliberal	dynamic.	First,	the	government	has	reportedly	awarded	licenses	to	a	number	of	well-connected	Syrian	investors	since	2015	to	 collect	 and	 sell	 the	 scrap	 metal	 from	 cities	 and	 towns	 that	 experienced	 massive	destruction	 through	 mostly	 regime	 air	 and	 artillery	 strikes.82	Moreover,	 the	 private	sector	was	given	a	 leading	role	for	the	reconstruction	plans.	For	example,	 in	July	2015	the	government	approved	a	law	that	allowed	the	establishment	of	private	sector	holding	companies	 to	 manage	 the	 public	 assets	 and	 services	 of	 city	 councils	 and	 other	 local	administrative	units,	 opening	 another	 avenue	 for	 regime	 cronies	 to	 generate	 business	from	public	assets.83																																																											
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These	measures	 should	not	be	understood	 the	way	 they	are	presented	by	 the	 regime,	that	is	as	necessary	and	“technocratic”	ones	aimed	at	overcoming	the	ravages	of	war	and	destructions.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 better	 understood	 as	 a	 means	 to	 transform	 and	strengthen	the	general	conditions	of	capital	accumulation.	As	argued	by	academic	Adam	Hanieh,	 states	 often	 seize	 upon	 crises	 as	moments	 of	 opportunity	 “to	 restructure	 and	push	 forward	change	 in	ways	 that	were	previously	 foreclosed	and	significantly	extend	the	reach	of	the	market	 in	a	range	of	economic	sectors	that	have	hitherto	been	largely	state	dominated.”84		
	
New	economic	elites			Crony	capitalists	and	new	economic	elites	affiliated	with	the	regime	largely	maintained	or	 expanded	 their	 operations	 in	 the	 country	 throughout	 the	 course	 of	 the	 war.	 They	benefitted	from	their	connections	to	continue	to	earn	high-margin	government	contracts	and	 exclusive	 import	 deals	 while	 expanding	 their	 businesses	 to	 smuggling	 and	 other	deals	associated	with	the	war	economy.	This	contributed	to	their	increasing	willingness	to	support	the	regime;	reciprocally	their	sustained	support	for	the	regime	also	allowed	them	 further	 opportunities	 to	 improve	 their	 socio-economic	 status	 by	 affording	 them	preferential	 access	 to	 industries	 and	 sectors	 that	 were	 abandoned	when	 competitors	fled	 Syria.85	Sanctions	 did	 not	 improve	 this	 situation;	 rather	 they	 exacerbated	 this	pattern.		
	Many	business	elites	decided	 to	 leave	Syria	and	 transfer	 large	sections	of	 their	capital	outside	 of	 the	 country	 throughout	 the	war.	 Researcher	 Samer	Abboud	 calculated	 that	total	withdrawals	from	Syrian	banks	amounted	to	around	$10	billion	by	the	end	of	2012.	The	majority	of	 this	money	was	 reinvested	 in	neighbouring	 countries.	 Some	 investors	transferred	their	activities	to	Turkey,	Jordan,	Egypt,	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates	after	the	Syrian	regime	permitted	 them	to	move	 their	equipment	out.86	The	majority	of	 this	segment	 of	 the	 business	 elite	who	 left	 the	 country	were	 not	 connected	with	 the	 new	networks	and	opportunities	provided	by	the	war	economy,	and	their	old	networks	that	had	 previously	 ensured	 their	 access	 to	 power	 in	 the	 past	 were	 now	 challenged	 or	disappearing.87			Alongside	crony-capitalists,	new	business	elites	were	able	to	capture	opportunities	left	by	 the	 gaps	 created	 from	 the	 departure	 of	 business	 elite	 networks	 that	 were	 very	influential	 before	 the	 war.	 Elections	 in	 the	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce	 in	 Aleppo	 and	Damascus	at	the	end	of	2014,	for	instance,	saw	a	significant	change	in	the	membership	of	 these	 chambers.88	Already	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 2014	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Industry	 had	nominated	 new	 individuals	 to	 sit	 on	 the	 boards	 of	 various	 Chambers	 of	 Industry	 in	Hama,	Aleppo,	Homs,	 and	Damascus.	This	move	was	 largely	 seen	as	a	 reprisal	 against	investors	 who	 had	 supported	 the	 opposition	 or	 who	 were	 deemed	 not	 sufficiently																																																									
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supportive	 of	 the	 regime.	 This	mirrored	 the	 parliamentary	 “election”	 results	 in	 2016,	after	 which	 70	 percent	 of	 the	 chamber’s	 members	 were	 new	 entrants,	 reflecting	significant	 change	 in	 the	 powerbase	 of	 the	 Syrian	 regime.89 	The	 2018	 municipal	elections	also	reflected	the	consolidation	of	the	regime’s	power	networks	at	the	lowest	level	 of	 society,	 with	 Baathists	 and	 regime	 affiliates	 winning	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	municipalities.	This	was	especially	important	as	local	councils	would	assume	the	official	responsibility	 for	reconstruction,	albeit	operating	under	 the	rules	 from	the	Ministry	of	Local	Administration.		Similarly,	 outside	 the	 country	 a	 new	 lobby	 of	 Syrian	 businessmen—the	 Grouping	 of	Syrian	 Businessmen	 in	 the	 World	 (GSBW)—was	 established	 in	 November	 2018	 in	Bucharest,	Romania.	The	GSBW	convened	investors,	most	of	them	Sunni	entrepreneurs	originally	from	Damascus	and	Aleppo,	who	are	now	located	in	more	than	20	countries	outside	Syria	and	who	have	maintained	connections	with	the	Syrian	regime.	Khaldoun	Al-Muwaqe’,	who	has	been	heading	the	regime-friendly	Grouping	of	Syrian	Investors	in	Egypt	 (GSIE)	 since	 2012,	 chaired	 this	 new	 body.	Rateb	 Al-Shallah,	 a	 symbol	 of	 the	traditional	Damascene	business	 class,	was	designated	honorary	president.90	According	to	Syria	Report,	GSBW	would	likely	aim	to	gain	a	share	of	the	reconstruction	business.91	
Dependency	on	foreign	actors	and	the	competition	for	spoils	Damascus’s	 political,	 military,	 and	 economic	 dependency	 on	 its	 allies	 in	 Tehran	 and	Moscow	increased	considerably	throughout	the	war.	Reconstruction,	which	depends	in	part	on	 foreign	 funding,	 is	 expected	 to	benefit	 Iran	and	Russia	as	 the	 states	 that	most	supported	the	Assad	regime.	Russia’s	 economic	 role	 in	 Syria	 increased	 progressively	 during	 the	 war.	 Already	 in	October	 2015	 a	 Russian	 delegation	 visited	 Damascus	 and	 announced	 that	 Russian	companies	 would	 lead	 Syria’s	 post-war	 reconstruction.	 Deals	 worth	 at	 least	 €850m	emerged	 from	 these	 negotiations.92	New	 trade	 and	 market	 opportunities	 for	 Russian	investors	and	companies	have	also	opened	up	since	2015,	notably	in	the	sale	of	cereals	and	wheat,	building	and	rehabilitation	of	electrical	power	plants,	and	heavy	machinery	to	be	used	by	the	construction	industry.93	The	most	attractive	opportunities	for	Russian	companies	were	in	Syria’s	oil	and	gas	resources.94		Officials	 from	Tehran	were	also	 looking	 to	benefit	 from	 the	 spoils	of	war.	The	 Iranian	intervention	 in	Syria	has	been	very	 costly	 for	 its	own	economy,	with	 Iran	 spending	at	least	 $30	 billion	 by	mid-2018	 in	military	 and	 economic	 aid,	 including	 the	 delivery	 of	
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crude	oil,	according	to	calculations	by	Mansour	Farhang,	a	US-based	scholar	and	former	Iranian	diplomat.95			Tehran	 assumed	 a	 dominant	 position	 in	 Syria’s	 trade	 relations	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	war	 through	 credit	 and	 investment	 programmes.	 Throughout	 2017	 and	 2018,	 Iranian	companies	 have	 been	 awarded	 multiple	 contracts	 both	 by	 the	 central	 Syrian	government	 and	 by	 the	 heads	 of	 governorates	 and	 municipalities	 to	 rehabilitate	 and	reconstruct	electricity	 infrastructure	 in	different	areas	of	 the	country.	These	deals	will	be	 worth	 hundreds	 of	 millions	 of	 dollars	 if	 finalised.96	At	 the	 same	 time,	 numerous	economic	 agreements	 and	 memoranda	 of	 understanding	 between	 the	 two	 countries	were	 concluded	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years,	 but	many	 of	 these	 deals	 have	 still	 not	 been	implemented	yet.		The	 prospect	 of	 reconstruction	 and	 access	 to	 natural	 resources	 presented	 some	opportunities	for	Iranian	and	Russian	actors,	but	also	the	potential	for	rivalry.	However,	this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 rise	 to	 the	 level	 of	 strategic	 disagreements	 between	 the	 two	 states.	Both	states	continue	to	stress	their	strong	cooperation	and	mutual	interests	in	Syria	at	the	time	of	writing.		The	 framework	of	Syria’s	 reconstruction,	but	also	private	and	public	 investment	more	generally,	should	be	seen	in	the	context	of	the	economic	interests	and	positioning	of	the	regime’s	 allies	 Russia	 and	 Iran	 and	 other	 possible	 foreign	 actors	 in	 the	 future.	 These	dynamics	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 completely	 interlinked	with	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 political	economy	 of	 the	 region	 and	 not	 separate	 from	 it.	 The	 increasing	 interest	 of	 regional	actors	 in	 the	 economic	 opportunities	 presented	 by	 reconstruction	 in	 Syria	 will	 have	important	 political	 consequences.	 These	 dynamics	 must	 be	 analysed	 as	 they	 will	influence	Syria’s	political	economy	and	its	reconstruction	plans.97			The	participation	of	other	foreign	actors	in	the	Syria’s	reconstruction	was	also	linked	to	other	 regional	 and	 international	 dynamics,	 especially	 vis-à-vis	 Iran.	 In	 the	 past	 few	months,	a	degree	of	political	rapprochement	has	occurred	between	Syria	and	some	Gulf	monarchies,98	particularly	 the	 UAE.99	Moreover	 direct	 opposition	 to	 Bashar	 al-Assad’s	rule	also	appeared	to	diminish,	even	in	Saudi	Arabia.	Among	the	many	reasons	behind	this	 shift,	 rapprochement	 with	 Damascus	 by	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 the	 UAE	 was	 linked																																																									
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primarily	 to	 countering	 Iranian	 influence	 in	 Syria100	and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 countering	the	 influence	 of	 Turkey,	 which	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 close	 ally	 of	 Qatar.	 	 Future	 research	could	 examine	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 consequences	 of	 possible	 reconciliation	between	these	actors	and	its	effect	on	reconstruction	efforts.			Similarly,	 reconstruction	 efforts	 might	 differ	 from	 region	 to	 region	 according	 to	 the	varying	levels	of	influence	and	presence	by	foreign	states	in	certain	areas	outside	of	the	sovereignty	 of	 the	 Syrian	 state.	 One	 example	 is	 the	 “Euphrates	 Shield	 Areas”	 under	Turkish	 domination	 where	 Turkish	 authorities	 invested	 significantly	 in	 governing	institutions	and	economic	 infrastructure.	More	generally,	a	key	question	 to	assess	 is	 if	Syria	 will	 witness	 parallel	 reconstruction	 efforts	 in	 areas	 controlled	 by	 or	 under	 the	strong	influence	of	different	political	actors	such	as	the	Syrian	Government,	the	PYD,	or	Turkish-controlled	 Northern	 areas.	 Differences	 in	 reconstruction	 plans	 between	 and	within	regions	may	impact	local	sectarian	and	ethnic	dynamics	in	a	post-war	Syria. 		At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 issue	 of	 refugees	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 their	 return	 is	 also	 an	important	factor	in	reconstruction.	Many	neighbouring	countries,	such	as	Lebanon	and	Turkey,	don’t	recognise	most	Syrians	living	there	as	refugees.	In	these	countries	there	is	growing	 domestic	 political	 pressure	 to	 forcefully	 return	 Syrians	 to	 Syria	 without	security	guarantees.	So	far,	Syrian	authorities	are	only	taking	in	small	flows	of	returnees.	For	many	refugees,	the	Syrian	state	still	presents	a	threat	to	their	safety101	or	at	the	least	it	 presents	 administrative	 obstacles	 to	 their	 returning	 to	 their	 original	 homes.	 Many	refugees	come	from	areas	that	have	been	completely	destroyed.102			A	 massive	 return	 of	 refugees	 would	 be	 a	 major	 challenge	 for	 the	 regime,	 politically,	economically,	and	in	terms	of	infrastructure,	particularly	if	many	were	to	return	within	a	short	period.	In	addition	to	this,	remittances	sent	by	Syrians	to	their	families	inside	the	country	 became	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 sources	 of	 national	 income	 and	 therefore	helped	boost	 internal	consumption.	According	to	World	Bank	data,	 the	value	of	Syrian	expat	 remittances	 in	 2016	 reached	 about	 $1.62	 billion—an	 average	 rate	 of	 about	 $4	million	daily	and	representing	a	bit	more	than	10	percent	of	GDP.103			Alongside	these	 issues,	reconstruction	plans	also	 faced	numerous	other	obstacles	such	as	 a	 lack	of	national	 funding,	whether	private	or	public,104	and	 international	 sanctions	preventing	 the	 participation	 of	 significant	 economic	 actors.	 However,	 historical	examples	 such	as	 those	 in	Lebanon	and	 Iraq	have	 shown	 that	even	adequate	 levels	of																																																									
100 Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman declared in March 2018 in an interview that Bashar al-Assad 
was staying, but he hoped he would not become a “puppet” for Tehran (Hennigan, W.J. (2018), “Saudi Crown 
Prince Says U.S. Troops Should Stay in Syria”, Time, http://time.com/5222746/saudi-crown-prince-donald-
trump-syria/, 
101 The U.N. refugee agency, UNHCR, has asserted since 2017 that it is not yet safe for refugees to return.  
102 Norwegian Refugee Council (2018), “Hundreds of thousands of Syrians risk being pushed to return in 2018 
despite ongoing violence, warn aid agencies”, https://www.nrc.no/news/2018/february/hundreds-of-thousands-
of-syrians-risk-being-pushed-to-return-in-2018-despite-ongoing-violence-warn-aid-agencies.  
103 Damas Post (2018), “Value of Annual Remittances to Syria at $1.5 Billion”, in the Syrian Observer, 1st 
March, https://syrianobserver.com/EN/news/21059/value_annual_remittances_syria_1_billion.html.  
104 The total assets of 14 private-sector commercial banks operating in the country reached SYP 1.7 trillion at the 
end of 2016, equivalent at the time to only around USD 3.5 billion. In terms of assets, some of the six state-
owned banks were actually larger than their private sector counterparts, in particular the Commercial Bank of 
Syria. However, these banks had large bad debt portfolios. (The Syria Report (2017), “Syrian Banks Unable to 
Finance Reconstruction”, op.cit.). 
national	 or	 international	 funding	 might	 not	 guarantee	 an	 effective	 reconstruction	process.		
Conclusion		Much	remains	to	be	written	about	the	impacts	of	the	war	in	Syria.	The	resilience	of	the	Syrian	regime	has	indeed	come	at	a	very	high	cost,	above	all	in	terms	of	human	lives	and	destruction,	but	also	politically.	In	addition	to	the	growing	dependence	on	foreign	states	and	 actors,	 some	 features	 of	 the	 patrimonial	 regime	 were	 strengthened	 while	 its	authority	was	diminished.	Crony	capitalists	and	heads	of	militias	considerably	increased	their	 power	 while	 the	 clientelist,	 sectarian,	 and	 tribal	 features	 of	 the	 regime	 were	reinforced,	 especially	 its	 Alawite	 identity.	 	 The	 war	 also	 allowed	 for	 the	 rise	 of	 new	businessmen	mostly	linked	to	the	regime,	while	the	vast	majority	of	Syrian	businessmen	in	the	diaspora	at	the	time	of	writing	remain	hesitant	about	returning	to	invest	 in	war	conditions.			More	 generally,	 the	 Assad	 regime	 emerged	 from	 the	 war	 as	 an	 even	 more	 brutal,	narrowly	sectarian,	patrimonial	and	militarized	version	of	 its	 former	self.	The	popular	uprising	that	turned	into	a	war	forced	Damascus	to	reconfigure	its	popular	basis,	narrow	its	 dependency	 on	 global	 authoritarian	 networks,	 adjust	 its	 modes	 of	 economic	governance	 to	 deepen	 neoliberal	 policies,	 and	 reorganize	 its	 military	 and	 security	apparatus.105	Repression	is	continuing	in	regime	areas,	including	for	former	opposition	fighters	 and	 civilians	 who	 participated	 in	 the	 so	 called	 “reconciliation	 agreements,”	while	 reconstruction	 in	 itself	 can	 not	 be	 an	 incentive	 for	 the	 return	 of	 refugees.	 The	return	 of	 refugees,	 especially	 those	 in	 neighbouring	 countries,	 depends	 first	 and	foremost	on	guarantees	of	protection	and	security	for	their	own	safety	and	that	of	their	property.		In	 this	 framework,	 the	 reconstruction	 plan	 of	 the	 Syrian	 government,	 which	 remains	underdeveloped,	will	 fortify	 and	 strengthen	 the	patrimonial	 and	despotic	 character	 of	the	regime	and	 its	networks,	while	being	employed	as	a	means	to	punish	or	discipline	former	 rebellious	 populations.	 European	 States	 have	 to	 take	 into	 consideration	 these	political	dynamics	when	tackling	the	issue	of	reconstruction.	While	reconstruction	is	an	absolute	necessity,	any	possible	participation	European	states	might	consider	taking	in	this	process	 should	not	be	used	 to	advance	and	consolidate	 the	normalisation	and	 re-legitimation	 of	 the	 Damascus’	 government	 while	 ignoring	 the	 rights	 of	 millions	 of	Syrians	within	and	outside	the	country.		Existing	literature	on	the	war	and	reconstruction	in	Syria	has	largely	focused	on	the	rise	of	a	few	new	economic	personalities,106	but	there	is	a	need	to	look	at	the	logics	behind	their	rise	 in	parallel	 to	 the	 fall	of	a	wider	circle	of	economic	elites	and	their	networks.	The	 imbrications	 and	 relations	 between	 cadres	 of	 security	 services	 and	 militias	 and	business	networks	have	thus	far	received	little	scholarly	attention.	Other	areas	in	need	of	 further	 study	 include	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 new	 legal	framework	for	economic	relations,	the	faith	of	new	economic	elites	in	existing	political																																																									
105 See notably Heydemann, Steven (2018), “Beyond Fragility: Syria and the challenges of reconstruction in 
Fierce States”, Foreign Policy at Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/FP_20180626_beyond_fragility.pdf.  
106 These include Samer Foz, Husam Qaterji, Mazen Tarazi, and Wissam Qattan among others. 
and	legal	frameworks	at	a	moment	of	diminishing	resources,	and	new	patterns	of	wealth	accumulation.		As	mentioned	in	the	text,	 the	 legal	 framework	of	reconstruction	will	most	probably	be	used	as	means	of	consolidating	old	and	new	networks	of	power	in	Syria,	but	it	could	also	contribute	 to	 changing	 the	 social	 and	 demographic	 structure	 in	 some	 areas.	 Further	questions	need	to	be	addressed	regarding	the	implementation	of	this	new	legal	arsenal,	its	 feasibility	 in	 economic	 terms,	 and	 its	 impact	 on	demographic	 and	 social	 dynamics.	Beyond	this	regulatory	framework,	the	question	remains	as	to	which	regions,	economic	sectors	and	categories	of	the	population	will	benefit	from—or	be	marginalised	by—the	government’s	 so-called	 reconstruction	 policies.	 The	 role	 of	 foreign	 actors	 in	 the	reconstruction	 plans	 and	 “stabilisation	 processes”—largely	 channelled	 through	 the	funding	of	INGOs	and	local	NGOs—also	needs	to	be	considered	within	this	framework	as	they	will	also	have	vast	consequences	on	the	political	economy	of	the	country.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 reconstruction	 process	will	 force	 the	 Damascus	 regime	 to	 deal	with	 a	 series	 of	 contradictions	 and	 challenges:	 on	 one	 side,	 it	will	 need	 to	 satisfy	 the	interests	of	crony	capitalists	and	head	of	militias;	on	the	other,	the	regime	will	need	to	keep	 for	 the	state	a	role	 in	 the	accumulation	of	capital	 through	economic	and	political	stability	while	 granting	 its	 foreign	 allies	major	 shares	 in	 the	 reconstruction	 business.	These	objectives	were	rarely	overlapping	at	the	time	of	writing	and	some	contradictions	and	 rivalries	 were	 already	 appearing.	 	 What	 remains	 to	 be	 mapped	 is	 how	 these	contradictions	might	themselves	be	translated	into	opportunities	for	local	and	external	actors.	
*	 This	 publication	 is	 part	 of	the	 Wartime	 and	 Post-Conflict	 in	 Syria	 project	 (WPCS)	which	is	funded	by	the	European	Union.	The	contents	are	the	sole	responsibility	of	the	authors,	and	do	not	necessarily	reflect	the	views	of	the	European	Union	
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